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CRIMINOLOGY
DECISIONS AND DATA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ROBBERY INCIDENTS
INTO OFFICIAL ROBBERY STATISTICS*
RICHARD BLOCK** AND CAROLYN R. BLOCK***
INTRODUCTION
That not all criminal incidents become official
•crime statistics is a common assertion. Robbery is
no exception to this rule. For example, for a Chi-
cago robbery incident to become an official robbery
statistic, the victim or some other citizen must first
report the incident to the police. Next, the patrol-
man who investigates the incident must write an
initial report identifying it, first as a crime and
second, as a robbery and not some other crime.
Finally, the detective division must decide that the
evidence shows that the incident was in fact a
robbery. If the division decides that it was another
crime, or not a crime at all, the incident is "un-
founded." Otherwise, the incident becomes one of
the robberies known to the police that are tabu-
lated as part of the Uniform Crime Reports.
Two generally acknowledged sources of data on
criminal incidents and official crimes in the United
States, commonly seen as competing with one an-
other, are the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), and
victimization surveys, especially the National
Crime Panel (NCP). The UCR has, for many
years, recorded crimes known to the police. The
NCP was established, in part, to estimate the in-
cidence of crime. The NCP and the UCR are not
competitive measures of the same data. They mea-
• The research in this article began at the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice of the University of Chicago
Law School. This study was supported by PHS Research
Grant No. 1R01M27575, NIMH (Center for Studies of
Crime and Delinquency), and by grants from the Ford
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We would like to thank Franklin Zimring for his constant
help, patience, and advice.
* * Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Loy-
ola University of Chicago.
*** Senior Analyst, Statistical Analysis Center, Illinois
aw Enforcement Commission.
sure different phenomena, data sets collected at
different stages of the transformation of a criminal
incident into an official crime statistic. Both the
NCP and the UCR are subject to error, primarily
errors of estimation for the NCP and errors of
measurement for the UCR. Even if both were
completely error-free, however, they would not
yield the same figures, because they measure dif-
ferent things. Victimization surveys estimate the
number of criminal incidents and the number of
incidents reported to the police. Police UCR statis-
tics tabulate crimes known to the police, those
incidents which were initially investigated and
which were not unfounded.
Figure 1 diagrams four of the data sets that
result from the series of decisions that transform a
robbery incident into an official robbery statistic:
all robbery incidents occurring, all robbery inci-
dents of which the police are notified, all robbery
incidents which the police investigate and initially
record as robberies, and all robberies known to the
police. Data may be gathered at other stages of the
transformation process, but this article will discuss
only these four.
Between the four data sets are three decision
pointsi where citizens and police decide either to
eliminate a case from the system or to allow it to
continue to the next step. Each data set includes
those cases that have survived all the previous
decision points. The intermediate transition prob-
abilities measure the probability of surviving from
one step to the next. The overall transition proba-
bility measures the probability of surviving from a
robbery incident to a robbery statistic. The first
decision point, between Data Set 1 and Data Set
2, primarily includes victims' decisions; the second
and third decision points are primarily police de-
cision.s.
Victim survey data provide estimates for the
number of cases in Data Set 1 and Data Set 2 and
the characteristics of those cases. The number of
1 See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 10-14 (1968).
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cases in Data Set 3 and Data Set 4 and the
characteristics of those cases may be tabulated from
police records and UCR statistics. However, re-
searchers and public administrators often use po-
lice or UCR data to draw conclusions about crim-
inal incidents, especially when victim survey data
are not available. What kind of errors, if any, result
when data from a later stage of the decision process
is used to infer the characteristics of an earlier
stage?
We can assume that a maximum number of
cases is passed on at each decision point. Because
each decisionmaker has limited time, money, and
other resources, some cases are eliminated from the
system. Are these cases eliminated randomly, or
are certain types of cases more likely to be elimi-
nated than others? By comparing the characteris-
tics of a later data set and an earlier data set, we
can infer whether the decisions that produced the
later data set were random, or whether they were
based on characteristics of the victim and offender,
or on characteristics of the robbery incident itself.
Non-random decisions will produce data at a later
stage of the decision process that are systematically
different from data at an earlier stage. Not only
will the total numbers be fewer, but the character-
istics of the data will also be different. Therefore,
conclusions based on a sample of data gathered at
a later stage would not necessarily apply to an
earlier stage.
This article has two goals. First, it illustrates the
effect of citizen and police decisions on the char-
acteristics of the data at early and later stages of
the transformation process. Second, it compares
citizen and police decisions. As a result of these
cumulative decisions, robbery data at a later step
of the transformation process are systematically
different from robbery data at an earlier step. The
comparison of data gathered at later and earlier
stages of the process can yield insights concerning
the making of decisions by citizens and police.
DESIGN AND METHODS
THE DIFFICULTY OF COMPARING DATA SETS
Few research studies have followed a criminal
incident from occurrence to official statistic. 2 The
2 Some studies have investigated citizen and police
decisions in reporting crimes. For example, Block ana-
lyzed the decision of the victim or the victim's represent-
ative to notify the police. For a national sample of 2,000
victims, Block found that, in general, the decision to
notify the police of crimes of personal violence was related
to variables such as the relationship between the victim
and the offender and the seriousness of the crime, rather
than to individual characteristics (age, sex, race, social
class) of either the victim or the offender. Block, Why
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dearth of studies is due not only to the hidden
nature of the decisions, but also to the extreme
methodological difficulty of the research. The only
such study yet attempted, by Schneider,3 is note-
worthy for its results and for its demonstration of
the difficulty of the research method. She did a
forward record check of a sample of four hundred
Index Crimes occurring in Portland in which vic-
tims reported that the police were notified, to
determine the final police disposition of each case.
This required an exhaustive search of police rec-
ords, for both the particular Index Crime and for
all its possible reclassifications, a costly process that
took many hours per case. 4 She determined that
53% of Index Crime incidents were ultimately
founded as a crime, either as the crime initially
reported or another crime.5
Other studies have used reverse record checks, in
which a sample of founded crimes is traced back to
a victimization survey. This method may be ap-
propriate to study the validity of victim surveys,
but it is not appropriate for the study of decision
points. It only represents the final outcome of the
decision tree, the number of robberies known to
the police in Figure 1, ignores all the cases which
were eliminated at each previous decision point,
and does not explain the cases where positive de-
cisions were made, because they cannot be com-
Notify the Police: The Victim's Decision to Notify the Police of
an Assault, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 555 (1974). Skogan found the
same result in national and city victim surveys. Skogan,
Crime and Crime Rates in SAMPLE SURVEYS OF THE VICTIMS
OF CRIME 105 (W. Skogan ed. 1976). Black studied the
police decision to write an initial report of certain crimi-
nal incidents where the complainant expressed a clear
preference for police action and the complainant and
suspect were strangers to one another, where the com-
plainant was very deferential toward the police as op-
posed to being merely civil, and where a deferential
complainant who preferred action was white-collar rather
than blue-collar. The police wrote a report in 72% of the
felony incidents. Black, Production of Crime Rates, 35 AM.
Soc. REV. 733 (1970); see also Black, The Social Organization
of Arrest, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (1971).3 A. Schneider, Methodological Problems in Victim
Surveys and their Implications for Research in Victimol-
ogy (Institute of Policy Analysis 1980) [hereinafter cited
as Victim Surveys]; A. Schneider, The Portland Forward
Record Check of Crime Victims: Final Report 8 (Oregon
Research Institute 1977).
4 Personal communication with Anne Schneider (Oc-
tober 1977).
5 Schneider estimates that, "an additional 15 percent
had not been located because of methodological problems
or because of the importance of protecting victim confi-
dentiality." A. Schneider, Victim Surveys, supra note 3,
at 10.
pared to the cases where negative decisions were
made. Thus, the forward record check which does
provide information about negative decisions, is
the appropriate method for the study of decision
points.
The forward check, however, is expensive and
time-consuming, as Schneider discovered. There-
fore, researchers have approximated forward rec-
ord check data by comparing victimization survey
samples to police records. This secondary analysis
of available data has a number of methodological
problems.6 Previous attempts to compare victimi-
zation survey data and police data as reported in
the UCR are invalid for three reasons. First, the
definition of a case differs. Victim surveys estimate
victimizations. Police records report incidents. An
incident may have more than one victim. Data
with incident estimates are available on computer
tape for the National Crime Surveys, but NCS
published reports do not use incident estimates.
Second, the geographical areas of the data sets
differ. Victimization surveys estimate victimiza-
tions occurring to residents ,of an area, regardless
of where the incident occurred, but not incidents
occurring to nonresidents when they were in the
area. Police reports include incidents occurring in
the area, to residents and nonresidents alike. Third,
the counting of commercial versus noncommercial
cases differs. Police reports count both commercial
and noncommercial crimes in the totals of crimes
reported to the police. The National Crime Surveys
have two subsurveys, commercial and household.
The two NCS data sets are collected and reported
separately. They are not completely comparable to
each other, and are not comparable to police data.
The study of decision points in the transforma-
tion of an incident into a recorded crime is thus a
methodological dilemma. Forward record checks
are expensive and time-consuming, but the faster
and less costly alternative method of secondary
analysis has pitfalls that, if not overcome, render it
invalid. This article employs secondary analysis of
victimization survey and police report data for
robberies in Chicago in 1974-75, but systematically
confronts each of the methodological threats to
validity and attempts to overcome them.
Secondary analysis of available data can provide
the answers to some questions more quickly and
cheaply than collecting individual case data with
a forward record check. There are limits to the
analysis that can be performed with available data.
We will argue that the questions posed by this
6 See Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Mathematical Perspective, 3
J. CriM. JUST. 177 (1975); Skogan, supra note 2.
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paper can be answered within acceptable limits of
validity, using available data.
DATA
The forward record check method measures the
number of cases at each step in Figure 1. The study
begins with a certain number of cases. Some move
forward at each decision point, and others drop
out. Percentages calculated with these figures refer
to the percent of these individual cases that reach
any given point.
In the secondary analysis of available data in
this article, we do not measure the number of cases
at each step in Figure 1. Nor do we follow individ-
ual cases from one step to the next. Rather, we use
separate data sets to estimate the total number of
cases at each step. This method relies on the as-
sumption that the estimate of cases at a later step
is an accurate representation of those cases at an
earlier step which would have progressed to the
later step. Since the samples are drawn separately,
this assumption can never be tested. However, we
can take every precaution to ensure that the esti-
mates are comparable-that they overcome each
of the threats to validity mentioned above. Even
when we have done this, percentages calculated
with these figures will still not refer to individual
cases. They will, instead, be estimates of transition
probabilities; that is, they will be estimates of the
probability of a robbery incident becoming a rob-
bery statistic.
We use three samples to estimate the number of
robbery cases at the four steps in Figure 1.7 We
manipulated the samples to overcome the obstacles
to comparability mentioned above: all samples are
of incidents, not victimizations, that occurred in
Chicago to Chicago residents, and were not com-
mercial.8 The victim survey sample represents in-
cidents taking place in 1974.9 The two police sam-
ples represent some months of 1975 and were
7 The definition of robbery used in this analysis is an
incident in which a person "takes property from the
person or presence of another by use of force or by
threatening the imminent use of force" ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 18 (1961), plus robbery attempts in which no
property loss occurs. This definition is consistent with
Chicago police practice, the Uniform Crime Reports, and
the National Crime Surveys definitions.
8 With one exception. See discussion concerning Sam-
ple 3 infra.
9 The Survey was conducted in March, 1975. Although
respondents were asked about incidents occurring in
1974, the telescoping effect probably reduces the number
of early 1974 cases and adds some cases from early 1975.
See R. Perrin, Illinois Victimization Survey Data: A
Guide to their Use (Illinois Law Enforcement Commis-
sion 1979).
weighted to represent all 1975 months. This anal-
ysis must, therefore, assume that 1974 and 1975
robbery cases may be compared.10 UCR founded
robbery statistics (which include commercial rob-
beries and robberies occurring in Chicago to non-
residents) do indicate that 1974 and 1975 were
similar."
Sample 1. The National Crime Panel (NCP) vic-
tim survey for Chicago for 1974, as disseminated
in incident extract file tapes by DUALabs, formed
the sample used to estimate the number of cases at
Step I and Step 2 of Figure 1. Noncommercial
robbery incidents occurring in Chicago were se-
lected for this analysis. NCP has a complex weight-
ing system which takes age, race, and sex into
account, but in general, each NCP weighted case
represents about one hundred real incidents. After
weighting, NCP estimates are 63,046 robbery in-
cidents (Step 1) and 31,523 robberies in which the
police were notified (Step 2).
Sample 2. Data gathered by the Center for Stud-
ies in Criminal Justice, with the cooperation of the
Chicago Police Department, from original records
of all officially recorded robberies for every fifth
day of the fourth through seventh police periods of
1975 formed the sample used to estimate Step 4.12
For comparability, only noncommercial robberies
occurring to Chicago residents were included in
this analysis. When weighted to estimate robberies
known to the police for the entire year, each real
case represents 16.25 estimated cases, and there are
10 It must also assume that all months are comparable
within a year. The second author has studied seasonality
of robbery incidents known to the police in Chicago and
has found no significant seasonal effect. C. Block, De-
scriptive Time Series Analysis for Criminal Justice Deci-
sion Makers: Local Illinois Robbery and Burglary (Illi-
nois Law Enforcement Commission 1979).
1 A total of 22,171 founded robberies occurred in
Chicago in 1975, according to CIME IN ILLINOIS (DLE).
This includes the robberies in this sample plus commer-
cial robberies and robberies occurring to nonresidents.
The noncommercial residential robbery incidents in our
sample are 82% of DLE total robberies. If we assume this
same proportion existed in 1974, when there were 26,172
DLE total robberies, we might expect to have had about
21,461 sample robberies. Thus, the 18,179 that we ac-
tually had probably underestimates 1974 robberies by
about 15%. The overall transition probability from inci-
dent to founding would be underestimated, given these
assumptions, by about 5% (34% instead of the 29% in
Figure 2). However, the exact extent of underestimation
cannot be known.
12 The Chicago Police Department divides the year
into thirteen periods of equal length. See R. BLOCK,




18,179 estimated robberies known to the police at
Step 4.
Sample 3. To estimate the number of robberies
initially recorded and investigated (Step 3), we first
estimated the number of unfounded robberies and
added this to the founded estimate (robberies
known to the police) in Sample 2. With the coop-
eration of the Chicago Police Department, we ob-
tained a complete listing of all founded and un-
founded initial robbery reports for the twelfth po-
lice period of 1975. This formed the basis for the
estimation of the unfounded portion of Sample 3,
and, when added to the estimate of founded rob-
beries, produced an estimate of the total robbery
incidents initially recorded and investigated.
Unfortunately, this sample was not as detailed
as the sample of founded robberies, and it is pos-
sible that it contains some commercial crimes or
crimes occurring to nonresidents. We decided to
use this sample despite these possible misclassified
cases because other information available on the
cases shows them to be noncommercial. Also, the
founded portion of this sample (which was not
used in the final estimate) was compared to the
Sample 2 foundeds, and the two were quite similar,
even after commercial and nonresidential robberies
had been removed from Sample 2. Any error that
might exist in Step 3 estimates will only affect
calculations including Step 3. Other calculations,
such as the overall flow probability to Step 4, will
not be affected.
Each real unfounded case represented thirteen
cases after weighting to represent the entire year.
When summed with the founded estimate, there
were 23,012 estimated cases investigated and re-
corded as robberies (Step 3).
CAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The transition probabilities in this analysis were
not calculated by following individual cases for-
ward from the incident, but rather estimated by
using a sample of cases at each step in the trans-
formation process. The samples should be inter-
preted as estimates of the probability that any
robbery will move from step to step, not as a
description of the actual flow of a sample of rob-
bery incidents. They are comparable to the "mar-
ginals" of a table, rather than the "interior" cells.
Several limits to the analysis of these marginals
are present. First, they give us only some kinds of
information about those cases which were elimi-
nated from the system. If we know the character-
:stics of the cases that survived, we can estimate by
subtraction the characteristics of the cases that did
not survive. However, the marginals cannot tell us
the disposition of the eliminated cases. Only a
forward record check could reveal whether a case
was reclassified as another crime, dropped com-
pletely, or disposed of in some other way.
Second, although analysis of the marginals tells
us which cases were eliminated and which survived,
it does not tell us how the decision to eliminate a
case was made. Despite our efforts to make the
samples as comparable as possible, it still remains
that the respondent in the victimization survey
does not have the same point of view as the police
record keeper. The following analysis should be
interpreted in that light. For example, notified
incidents are those incidents in which the victim
reports that the police were notified, not incidents
which the police consider as having been reported
to them.
Although the estimated transition probabilities
tell us the result of what happened at the decision
point, what happened may not have been a deci-
sion in the usual sense. For example, a robbery
victim may call the police, but inadvertently give
an incorrect address. This would count, in the
marginals, as a robbery incident where the police
were notified, but it would not count as an initially
recorded and investigated robbery, because the
police could not locate the complainant. Thus,
although neither the victim nor the police may
actually decide to eliminate a case, it could, nev-
ertheless, be eliminated.
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FOR ROBBERY
We are now able to estimate the probability that
a robbery case will move from one step to the next,
and be transformed from an incident into an offi-
cial robbery statistic. These transition probabilities
are presented in Figure 2.
The ratio of notified robberies to robbery inci-
dents in Figure 2 is .50. The police are notified in
only 50% of robbery incidents. The other half are
eliminated from the transformation process. Al-
though this 50% figure is an estimate, it coinpares
closely to Schneider's finding based on the more
rigorous forward record check method. She found
that 53% of robbery incidents were reported to the
police.'3 There were too few robbery cases in
Schneider's sample to allow a calculation of the
percent of notified robberies that the police initially
recorded or founded.
13 A. Schneider, Victim Surveys, supra note 3, at 17.
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ESTIMATED PROBABILrIY FLOW OF ROBBERY INCIDENTS FOR CHICAGO FROM OCCURRENCE TO FOUNDING
The ratio of robberies initially investigated and
recorded to notified robberies is .73, and the ratio
of robberies known to the police (founded) to ini-
tially recorded robberies is .79. Therefore, the first
decision point, which is mainly victim decisions,
eliminates more robbery cases than does the com-
bination of the second plus the third decision
points, which are mainly police decisions. Half of
the original 63,046 estimated incidents remain after
the first decision point, the decision to notify the
police. Of these 31,523, an estimated 73% are
initially recorded as robberies, and 58% become a
robbery known to the police.
The overall transition probability, which is the
product of the three intermediate transition prob-
abilities, is 29%. An estimated 29% of all noncom-
mercial robberies occurring in Chicago to residents
in 1974-75 became robberies known to the police.
This probability represents the cumulative effect of
decisions made by victims and the police. Of the
63,000 robberies estimated to have occurred, only
18,000 became official statistics.
VICTIM AND POLICE DECISIONS
Figure 2 indicates that both victims and police
limit the number of cases they send on to the next
stage. But do these decisions follow a pattern or are
they totally random? If they are not random, how
do they affect the characteristics of victim survey
data and police data? The remaining sections of
this paper examine these two questions.
One possible pattern for victim and police deci-
sions is a bias according to characteristics of the
victim. However, when these data were analyzed
by age, sex, and race of the victim, there was no
difference in any decision probability. An alterna-
tive hypothesis is that victim and police decisions
are based on the nature of the incident. Perhaps
the more serious the incident, the more likely it is
to survive at each step of the decision tree.14 The
following analysis will explore the effect of two
indicia of robbery seriousness-the presence of a
gun, and whether property was lost (tha. is,
whether the robbery was attempted or completed).
In addition, it will examine the effect of a third
variable, victim resistance, on these relationships.
SERIOUSNESS
Figure 3 represents the same data as Figure 2,
but cases have been categorized by seriousness-
14 In Black's sample, Production of Crime Rates, supra note
2, for example, the seriousness of the offense (misde-
meanor versus felony) was related to the probability of
initial recording and arrest. Skogan, supra note 2, also
found seriousness to be more importantthan individual
characteristics in the victim's decision to notify the police.
See also Hindelang & Gottfredson, The Victim's Decision
Not to Invoke the Criminal justice Process, in CRIMINALJUSTICE
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FIGURE 3
EFFECT OF ROBBERY SERIOUSNESS ON DECISIONS
whether a gun was used and whether the robbery
was completed. Victim and police decisions are
affected by the seriousness of the incident, espe-
cially by whether the robbery was completed. Only
5% of attempted robberies become official police
statistics, compared to 41% of completed robberies.
Seriousness not only affects the overall transition
probability, but also affects the step at which most
cases exit from the system. Most of the eliminated
completed robbery incidents are eliminated at the
decision point between Step 1 and Step 2, the
victim's decision to notify the police. The police
eliminate relatively few completed robbery cases or
robberies with a gun. However, victims eliminate
a higher percentage of robberies with a gun than
the police. Thus, most serious cases that are elimi-
nated are eliminated by the victim, not by the
police. On the other hand, less serious robbery
incidents do not show as large a difference between
victim and police decisions.
Figure 4 details the joint effects of those two
seriousness variables.1 5 The combinations are com-
pleted robberies with gun use and attempted rob-
IS Studies of founded robberies show a relationship
between gun use and completion. J. CONKLIN, ROBBERY
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1972); Block, supra
note 2; Skogan, Citizen Reportal of Crime: Some National
Crime Panel Data, 13 CRIMINOLOcY 535 (1976).
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beries with no gun. Fifty percent of the first inci-
dent become an official founded statistic, but only
5% of the second. The difference is especially strik-
ing for police decisions. Police write an initial
report in 99% of notified completed robberies with
a gun, but in only 28% of notified attempted
robberies without a gun. The two intermediate
combinations of completion and gun use stand
between the two extremes, as might be expected,
but completed robbery incidents without a gun are
much more likely to become a founded statistic
(31%) than attempted robberies with a gun (9%).
Also a larger difference appears in the overall
16,312
percentage founded for attempts versus comple-
tions with gun use held constant than for no gun
use versus gun use with completion held constant.
This indicates that whether the robbery was com-
pleted or attempted is more important than
whether or not a gun was used in determining the
decisions of the public and the decisions of the
police. Gun use is only important when combined
withcompletion of the robbery.
Further, for completed robberies the factor of
gun use is important only to police decisions, not
to the victim's decision to notify the police. The
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FIGURE 5
COMBINED EFFECTS OF ROBBERY COMPLETION AND VICTIM RESISTANCE ON DECISIONS
completed robbery incident is virtually the same
whether or not a gun was used, but the police are
more likely to decide to initially report a completed
incident as a robbery and to found it if the robber
used a gun. On the other hand, whether the rob-
bery was completed is important at every decision
point, both for victim and for police decisions, and
for incidents with or without a gun.
Therefore, whether the robbery was completed
or only attempted is the main factor in the victim's
decision to notify the police. This factor is also
important in police decisions, but the police also
take gun use into consideration in reporting com-
pleted robberies.
VICTIM RESISTANCE
Victim resistance has been found to be related
both to whether the robbery was completed and to
whether a gun was used for founded robberies.
6
Does a relationship exist between resistance and
the decisions of victims or police to send a case on
to the next step? Figure 5 outlines the combined
16 Block, supra note 2.
-- 57% -- 77%
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effects of victim resistance and robbery completion
on transition probabilities. Only three samples are
given, since initial report data were not available
for resistance.
Completed robberies with no resistance are more
likely to be transformed from an incident into an
official statistic than attempted robberies with re-
sistance. Robberies in which the victim resisted,
and where the resistance was apparently successful
because the robbery was not completed, have only
a five percent chance of becoming an official sta-
tistic. The intermediate combinations-completed
robberies with resistance and attempted robberies
without resistance-show that whether the robbery
was completed, with resistance held constant, is
important to the decisions of both victims and
police. Resistance, with completion held constant,
affects victim and police decisions in opposite ways.
The police are more likely to unfound a notified
robbery incident, whether completed or attempted,
if the victim resisted, but victims are slightly more
likely to notify the police if they resisted.
The same pattern exists for the combined effects
of victim resistance and gun use. Figure 6 indicates
that either variable makes little difference in the
victim's decision to notify the police, but both
No Resistance
Gun
15,365K f 8,604 7,269
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FIGURE 6
COMBINED EFFECTS OF VicnM RESISTANCE AND GUN USE ON DECISIONS
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affect the police decision to initially investigate the
incident or to unfound it. Police are more likely to
unfound a robbery incident if the victim resisted
and resistance is, in fact, more important to the
police decision than is gun use.
In summary, neither victim decisions nor police
decisions are random. Both victims and police are
less likely to eliminate a robbery from the system
if it is completed, not merely attempted. The police,
in addition, are less likely to eliminate a case if it
is committed with a gun and if the victim does not
resist.
EFFECT OF DECISIONS ON DATA
The previous section showed that neither citizen
nor police decisions to eliminate robbery cases from
the system are random. Therefore, the data sets
produced by these decisions will differ. Moreover,
a sample of data collected at a later stage of the
transformation process will have different charac-
teristics than a sample of data collected at an
earlier stage. This section illustrates how the choice
of sample affects the apparent relationships among
three variables-whether the robbery was com-
tal Incidents = 63,046 cases
loss 20%





as Robberies = 23,012 cases
Robberies Known to the Police = 18,179 cases
FIGURE 7
ATTEMPTED VERSUS COMPLETED ROBBERIES (No Loss VERSUS Loss) AT FOUR STAGES IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS
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TABLE A
EFFEar OF SAMPLE ON APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTIM RESISTANCE AND ROBBERY COMPLETION
INCIDENT SAMPLE
Attempted Completed




















aRobberies known to the police.
pleted, whether a gun was used, and whether the
victim resisted.
The area of each of the four circles in Figure 7
corresponds to the number of cases that survived
to each stage of the transformation process. Not
only does the "circle" of cases become smaller with
each succeeding step, but the characteristics of
those cases also change. Figure 7 illustrates one
characteristic, the percent of robberies that were
completed versus those robberies that were only
attempted. Because both citizens and police sys-
tematically eliminate attempted robberies, 33% of
total robbery incidents are attempts, but only 6%
of robberies known to the police are attempts.
Using official police statistics (robberies known to
the police) to determine the likelihood that an
attempted robbery incident is completed will thus
be misleading.
The researcher's choice of sample affects the
apparent effect of victim resistance on whether or
not the robbery was completed (Table A). In the
founded robbery sample, a victim's resistance ap-
pears to have little effect. Seventy-eight percent of
resisted robberies were completed despite the re-
sistance, and resistance only improved the victim's
chance of not having the robbery completed by
twenty percentage points. On the other hand, in
the incident sample, the majority of resisted rob-
beries were not completed, and the percentage








appears to be more rational in samples gathered
from data early in the transformation process.
The same distortion that occurs with completion
data also occurs with gun use data, but to a lesser
extent (see Table B). A study testing the hypothesis
that victims are less likely to resist when a gun is
used would find more support for the argument in
a sample of robbery incidents than in a sample of
robberies known to the police. Similarly, Table C
illustrates the misleading conclusions from using
founded data to infer the effect of victim resistance
on whether the robbery incident will be completed
or only attempted, holding constant the effect of
gun use.
The incident sample suggests that resistance is
rational. Whether or not the robber uses a gun,
most of the robberies that are not resisted are
completed (91% and 87%). However, if the victim
resists, fewer than half of the robberies are com-
pleted (49% and 39%). Resistance thus improves
the victim's chances of foiling the attempted rob-
bery by 42 or 48 percentage points. On the other
hand, the founded sample suggests that resistance
makes little sense. Nearly all robberies without
resistance were completed (98% and 97%) as were
81% and 75% of the resisted robberies. Instead of
improving the victim's chances by about 45 per-
centage points as in the incident sample, resistance
TABLE B
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TABLE C
APPARENT EFFECT OF VICTIM RESISTANCE ON WHETHER THE ROBBERY WAS COMPLETED, CONTROLLING FOR GuN USE,
IN THREE SAMPLES


































aNumbers in parentheses are total N's
bRobberies known to the police.
in the founded sample appears to improve the
victim's chances of foiling the attempted robbery
by about twenty percentage points.
A sample of founded data, therefore, would be
a biased indicator of the relationship between gun
use, victim resistance, and the completion of rob-
bery incidents. Similarly, a sample of incident data
cannot be assumed to be an unbiased indicator of
the characteristics of robberies known to the police.
An incident sample, taken from victim survey data,
describes the victim as resisting when a gun is not
present, and then probably being successful in the
resistance. A sample of robberies known to the
police gives an image of a victim who is less rational
in resisting and more powerless to affect the situa-
tion. The earlier in the decision process that data
are gathered, the more rational and the more self-
protective citizens appear to be.
That the characteristics of victim survey samples
are systematically different from the characteristics
of police data samples does not imply that one is





two sets measure different phenomena. The data
exist at different steps in the transformation process
from a robbery incident to an official robbery
statistic. All the decisions that occurred earlier in
the process cumulatively alter the characteristics of
data. Victim survey data can describe the charac-
teristics of robbery incidents. Police data can de-
scribe the characteristics of robberies known to the
police. The two measures are not the same.
17
CONCLUSIONS
Both citizens and the police make decisions on
whether a robbery incident should become an of-
ficial robbery statistic or it should be eliminated
from the system. As a result of these cumulative
decisions, robbery data at a later step of the trans-
formation process are systematically different from
robbery data at an earlier step. A comparison of
these data sets helps explain the decisions that
produced them. Such a comparison also points out
the danger of using data from a later step of the
transformation process to make conclusions about
the characteristics of data at an earlier step.
This article suggests the following conclusions:
(1) Overall, about one-fourth of Chicago noncom-
mercial robbery incidents become official robbery
statistics. (2) Neither citizen nor police decisions to
eliminate a robbery from the system are random.
They are affected by the robbery situation, not by
the characteristics of the victim or offender. (3)
Whether the robbery was completed or only at-
tempted is the main factor in the victim's decision
to notify the police. Completion is also of major
importance in police decisions, but the police take
gun use and victim resistance into consideration. 18
17 Hindelang & Gottfredson, supra note 14, argue that
the same thing is true of official data and self-report
surveys of delinquency. They find that both are valid,
"within the domain of behavior effectively tapped by
each method."
'8 Future studies may discover other factors that vic-
tims or police also take into consideration, for example,
the extent of injury to the victim or the amount of
property stolen. It is also quite possible that these data
represent only Chicago noncommercial robberies in
1974-75. On the other hand, the phenomena found here
may be more universal. Therefore, this analysis should
be repeated for other places, times, and crimes. Once the
Such data may suggest a circular effect. Citizen
and police decisions on whether a robbery incident
should continue to the next reporting step seem to
be based on a stereotypical idea of robbery-a
helpless victim attacked by a gun-wielding thug.
The more an incident approximates this ideal rob-
bery, the more likely it will become an official
robbery statistic. Yet, on what is the stereotype
based? Probably, police support the stereotype with
official reports of robbery. If true, then the exis-
tence of the stereotype produces the facts that
support it.
Since neither citizen nor police decisions are
random, the characteristics of a sample of data
from a later stage of the transformation process are
different from the characteristics of a sample gath-
ered at an earlier stage. They differ in the preva-
lence of completion, gun use, and resistance. They
also differ in the apparent relationships among
these three variables. Therefore, conclusions about
robbery incidents should be based on incident
data; conclusions about founded robberies should
be based on founded data. Otherwise, those con-
clusions will be distorted.
One objection to victimization survey data is
that the "extra" crimes uncovered are likely to be
minor compared to police statistics. This analysis
of Chicago robbery data supports that contention.
The incident sample had more attempts, for ex-
ample, than the founded sample. However, it is
these very cases which may be the most interesting.
For example, they include incidents in which citi-
zen self-defense thwarted a more serious crime.
However, to conclude that either victim survey
data or official police data is superior to the other
would be a mistake. Both uniquely measure a stage
in the transformation process from robbery inci-
dent to robbery statistic. This article demonstrates
a method for studying the measures in combina-
tion. It systematically overcomes methodological
obstacles to using both victim survey data and
police data in the same analysis.
transformation process has been more generally investi-
gated, it may be possible to weight founded data in order
to obtain estimates of incident characteristics. See Maltz,
supra note 6.
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